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The Complex Litigation Project's
Choice of Law Rules for Mass Torts
and How to Escape Them
[Ildentifiing and analyzing the issues in controversy and the
debate that centers on those issues may be of more lasting
importance than any particular solution; no choice of law
solution will accommodate everyone's concerns. Only if we are
able to organize the core issues that need to be addressed in
any choice of law proposal will there be the possibility of
slowly working toward a consensus on these matters.'

On May 13, 1993, the American Law Institute (ALI)
adopted the Statutory Recommendations (the "Proposal") of the
Complex Litigation project2 and recommended it for passage
by Congress. The Complex Litigation Project (the "Project")
contemplates large-scale consolidation of complex litigation in a
single state or federal court. The types of cases that would be
affected by the Proposal are those involving hundreds,
thousands, and even millions of litigants who are seeking to
litigate mass tort or contract issues in either the state or
federal court system. Examples of tort cases likely to be
consolidated under the Proposal are products liability
litigati~n,~
securities litigation, air crashes, and other mass
torts.4 The Project has been highly praised in some circles.' It
1. Mary K. Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation:
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309, 311 (1991).
2. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEXLITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS(1994), [hereinabr COMPLEX LITIGATIONPROPOSAL]. The
Proposal is the result of ten years of work on the Project, which was led by
Professors Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane as Reporters.
3. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 713
(E.D.N.Y.1984); see also P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALI's
Complex Litigation Project: A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L. REV. 953, 968 (1994)
(identifying product liability cases and single-event accident cases as the two major
patterns of mass torts in the United States).
4. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases (Hyatt Regency Hotel Disaster,
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has also been roundly disparaged by its c r i t i d One of the
more debated parts of the Project has been its choice of law
provisions, which are contained in Chapter 6 of the Proposal.
This discussion of the Project's choice of law rules is confined to
section 6.01, the proposed approach to mass tort choice of law.
Choice of law questions present some of the most complicated
issues in the American procedural system. And not
surprisingly, the complexity of these issues increases
exponentially in the case of mass tort litigation, as countless
litigants engage in multiforum civil litigation. As a result, the
Project's means of dealing with the significant choice of law
questions posed by multiforum consolidation of litigation are of
central importance in assessing the value of the proposed
federal legislation.
The approach of the Project in the area of mass tort choice
of law is to codify precise, mechanical, even rigid rules for
determining which state's law will apply to consolidated
litigation. Underlying the entire choice of law approach is the
driving intention of the Project to ensure that one state's law
will apply to common issues, notwithstanding the fact that the
involved litigants may hail from all fifty states as well as
foreign nations, and regardless of the fact that many litigants
may have no contact at all with the state whose law would
apply under the strictures of section 6.01. While such
mechanical uniformity would likely lead to increased efficiency
in the handling of complex litigation, the potential for unfair
results is implicit in the approach chosen by the Project and
recommended by subsections 6.01(a), (c), and (d).
An escape hatch from the "one-state's-law" rule is found in
subsection 6.01(b), which allows for the division of litigants into
July 17, 1981), 97 F.R.D. 365 W.D. Mo. 1982).
5. See, e.g., Symeon C . Symeonides, The ALI's Complex Litigation Project:
Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REV.843, 844 (1994) ("It is perhaps
the most innovative, resourceful, and ambitious work ever undertaken in the
United States on the subject of multistate complex litigation.");see also James A.R.
Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the
Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1994) ("The AZII Project deserves great
credit for citing and clearly summarizing leading scholarship about choice of law in
mass tort cases. It is striking, however, that the cited literature and the Project
itself seldom stray beyond a select few cases.").
6. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposal for
Fedemlly-Mandated Choice of Law in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State
Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085 (1994); David E. Seidelson, Section 6.01 of the
ALrs Complex Litigation Project: Function Follows Form, 54 LA. L. REV. 1111,
1111 (1994) (deriding the Project's "jerry-built choice-of-law provision").
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subgroups for the purpose of applying a different state's law to
each.? There is potential for this provision to diminish the
harshness of the one-state rule and still preserve significant
gains in efficiency. This thesis will be discussed below.
The present purpose of this article is to discuss the choice
of law approach for mass torts contained in the Proposal in
light of modern American choice of law theory. Part I1 of this
paper includes a brief discussion of some of the theories that
influence modern choice of law in the United States. The
precise rules embodied in section 6.01 of the Proposal are set
forth in Part III(A), while Part III(B) seeks to illuminate the
theoretical underpinnings of the Drafkers' chosen approach to
choice of law. Part III(C) is an analysis of the debate that has
taken place regarding the approach of section 6.01, while Part
III(D) contains a suggestion on the proper use and scope of
subsection 6.01(b).
Part IV concludes that the debate over section 6.01
generally will continue uninhibited, especially if Congress
determines to consider some form of the Proposal's provisions
for passage, and that subsection 6.01(b) should be used
liberally to help preserve fair results and to comport with
litigants' expectations as to applicable law. While such liberal
application of the escape hatch might not have been contemplated by the Reporters to the Complex Litigation Project, it
may be essential in order to make the proposal attractive
federal legislation. Therefore, if Congress should take up the
issue of passing some derivative of the Proposal, it should
make clear its intent that subsection 6.01(b) be used liberally
and regularly by the federal courts.

A. Current State of Choice of Law Theory
There are two prerequisites to establishing a choice of law
question in a tort case. First, two or more states must be involved, since if all contacts with the tortious act involve only
one state, no other state could reasonably seek to apply its law
to the process of determining a remedy. This requirement
would seem to be satisfied in the vast majority of cases contemplated by the Complex Litigation P r o j e ~ t . ~
7. Parallel provisions appear in 5 6.02(b) and in 4 6.03(b), allowing for
subdivision of litigants in mass contract cases.
8. See COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, 4 3.01(b). The Proposal
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Second, the laws of the competing states must be in conflict with each other. In other words, the various states must
have different methods of remedying the particular tortious
~ o n d u c t Again,
.~
since the majority of mass torts that would
qualify for consolidation under the legislation proposed by the
Project would apparently involve litigants having contacts with
multiple jurisdictions, this requirement would likely be satisfied in the vast majority of consolidated cases emerging fkom
the Complex Litigation Panel. In short, the very nature of the
mass tort cases sought to be affected by the Complex Litigation
Project forecasts significant choice of law problems in consolidated cases, a fact that is compounded by the Reporters' interest in having "a single state's law [apply] to all similar tort
claims being asserted against a defendant."1°

1. First Restatement of Conflict of Laws: lex loci delicti
The traditional choice of law rule in torts cases originally
adopted by each state is lex loci delicti:" the forum state applies the law of "the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."12 The
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopted the doctrine of
lex loci delicti-the "place of injury" rule.13 The First Restate-

urges interdistrict consolidation when the number of parties and actions and the
geographic dispersion of those actions are such that significant gains in efficiency
can be attained. See id. Intuitively, these guidelines would seem to apply most frequently when the tortious conduct has had far-reaching effects to the extent that
many states (and/or foreign sovereigns) would have contacts with the subject of the
litigation. Specifically, the cases most frequently alluded to by the Reporters in
8 6.01, the Proposal's Mass Torts choice of law section, are those involving products liability, airline crashes, and securities litigation. See generally id. Chapter 6,
Introductory Note and comments to 8 6.01. In short, it seems that if a particular
set of cases is sufficiently complex and its litigants are sufficiently numerous and
diverse for the proposed Complex Litigation Panel to order consolidation, the set of
cases will normally have contact with a sufficient number of states and/or sovereigns for this first prerequisite to be satisfied.
9. See Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34 MERCERL. REV. 593, 597 (1983).
10. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, 8 6.01(a).
11. Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of
Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 51 (1989).
12. RESTATEMENT
OF CON~ICT
OF LAWS8 377 (1934).
13. See id. Lex loci delicti stems from the common-law "vested rights" doctrine, under which "each state conceptually had control over all incidents within its
borders. Each state had jurisdiction to determine the effect of tortious acts committed within the state. Only the jurisdiction where the dispute arose was capable of
giving the parties the right to a cause of action in court." Leigh Ann Miller,
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ment formulation of the rule can best be described as a set of
rigid conflicts rules, which dominated American conflicts law
for decades.14 The benefits of the traditional rule "include its
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of application."15 Indeed, the rule's mechanical application would seem to give potential litigants a rather clear indication of which state's law
would apply to any dispute.
However, among the disadvantages of lex loci delicti is the
fact that the state where the injury occurred may have no other
contact with the litigation, a particularly important point in the
context of the single-event mass disaster such as an airline
crash. Further, application of the doctrine often results in
harsh decisions and involves little balancing of interests or
equities? Commentators argue that the few states still adhering to the doctrine do so because of the faults of other, more
modern theories. l7
Due to the rigidity of lex loci delicti, states began to recognize exceptions to the rule,18 applying the law of the forum
to procedural issues,lg or applying the forum law "if the lex
loci choice contradicted the forum's 'public
Eventu-

Choice-of-Law Approaches in Tort Actions, 16 AM. J. TRIALADVOC.859, 861 &
1111.12-15 (1993). The principal American proponent of the vested rights doctrine
was Joseph H. Beale, the reporter of the First Restatement, although the doctrine
had European proponents, including Dicey. EUGENEF. SCOLES& PETERHAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS # 2.5, at 13 (1992) [hereinafter SCOLES & HAY]. Dicey's formulation
was that: "'Any right which has been duly acquired under the law of any civilized
country is recognized and, in general, enforced by English Courts, and no right
which has not been duly acquired is enforced or, in general, recognized by English
WITH REFERENCE
Courts.'" Id. (quoting DICEY,A DIGESTOF THE LAWOF ENGLAND
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 16-22 passim (1896)). Beale's formulation is analogous:
"'A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in
CONFLICTOF LAWS
question anywhere.'" Id. (quoting J.H. BEALE,3 CASESON
517 (1901)).
14. Scorns & HAY, supra note 13, # 2.5, at 15. "[Mlany of the 'basic rules' of
the First Restatement remain and continue to be retained" even today, although
often only as one choice among several, as in the Second Restatement. Id. # 2.5, a t
15-16.
15. Miller, supra note 13, at 861.
16. See id. at 864 & 11.49. Scoles and Hay characterize lex loci delicti as
"fixed and thus mechanical-but also predictable." Scorns & HAY, supra note 13,
# 2.6, at 16.
17. See Herma H. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34
MERCERL. REV. 521, 583 (1983); Miller, supra note 13, at 864.
18. Miller, supra note 13, at 861.
19. See Solimine, supra note 11, at 51.
20. Id. at 52-53.
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ally, the majority of American states came to reject lex loci
deli~ti.~'
Dissatisfaction with the fixed, mechanical First Restatement approach spawned numerous new suggestions and responses, resulting in what is considered a "revolution" in American conflicts law.22In true revolutionary fashion, commentators proposed myriad alternatives to lex loci d e l i ~ t i . ~ ~
2.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: the "most significant relationship" test
The approach of the Second Restatement may be fairly
characterized as a formula for finding the "right line" between
rigidity and flexibility in choice of law situations. Accordingly,

21. Only fifteen jurisdictions currently adhere to lex loci delicti in deciding
choice-of-law questions. Miller, supra note 13, a t 863 & 11.32 (listing Alabama,
Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming as
states that follow lex loci delicti).
22. Peter Hay & Robert B. Ellis, Bridging the Gap Between Rules and Approaches in Tort Choice of Law in the United States: A Survey of Current Case
Law, 27 INTX LAW369, 370 (1993); see also SCOLES& HAY, supra note 13, 8 2.6,
a t 16.
23. These theories include Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, see
OF LAWS 182 (1963) (advoBRAINERD
CURRIE,SELECTEDESSAYSON THE CONFLICT
cating application of the forum law unless the foreign state has a legitimate policy
interest in enforcing its laws and the forum state has no policy interest in the
case); Ehrenzweig's Lex Fori Theory, see Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the
United States, 38 HASTINGSL.J. 1041, 1050 (1987) (discussing Ehrenzweig's lex fori
theory, which entails the nearly wholesale application of the forum state's law); the
modern Interest-Balancing Theories of von Mehren, Trautman and Weintraub, set
forth variously in A.T. VON MEHREN& DONALDT. TRAUTMAN,THE LAW OF
MULTISTATEPROBLEMS
341-75 (James Kasner ed., 1965); A.T. von Mehren, Recent
Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELLL. REV. 927 (1975); RUSSELLJ.
WEINTRAUB,COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICTOF LAWS 270, 345-46 (1980) (each
stressing the importance of weighing competing jurisdictions' interests in having
their respective laws applied to cases); Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations,
set forth originally in Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966) (identifying five independent considerations-predictability, interstate order, simplicity, government interest, and application of the better rule-that courts should weigh in deciding which law to apply);
the Second Restatement's "Most Significant Relationship" test, see discussion infra,
part II.A.2; and, finally, court-elected Eclecticism, which is the judicial policy adopted by a small minority of states of selecting various hybrids of the above theories,
see William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCERL. REV. 645 (1983) (criticizing eclectic choice of law as
"methodless ad hoc decisionmaking." Id a t 651.); James E. Westbrook, A Survey
and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism,
40 MO. L. REV. 407, 412 (1975) (praising the versatility of Eclecticism). See generally SCOLES& HAY, supra note 13, $8 2.6-3.
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the Second Restatement "draws on much of the thought of the
period during which it was drafted (1952-1971) and attempts to
provide as much of 'the right line,' the balance [between rigid
rules and flexible principles], as was possible in the light of the
development of the law a t that time."24 Thus the Second Restatement represents what might be called the best thinking on
choice of law since the First Restatement's adoption of lex loci
delicti, and it is the approach selected by a plurality of states
(22) to replace lex loci d e l i ~ t i . ~ ~
The Second Restatement approach principally consists of
three elements: the policy guidelines of section 6, the "most
significant relationship" concept, and various lists of connecting
factors. Section 6 provides that, absent a statutory directive on
choice of law, a court will consider various factors relevant to
the choice of law issue.26These factors include
the needs of the interstate and international systems,
the relevant policies of the forum,
the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
ease in the determination and application of the law to
be a~plied.~'

Since these factors are not listed in order of priority, they do
not enable the court to choose any particular state's law over
that of another state.
However, the factors become more significant in light of
other sections of the Second Restatement, particularly section
145, which provides for application of the law of the state with
the "most significant relationship" to the transaction or occurrence in tort cases.28Section 145 further provides the relevant

24. SCOLES& HAY, supra note 13, 9 2.13, at 34-35.
25. Miller, supra note 13, at 872 & 11.127 (listing Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington).
26. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF C O ~ I COF
T LAWS 9 6 (1971).
27. Id. 5 6(2).
28. Id. § 145(1). Section 146 of the Second Restatement applies to personal
injuries:
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"connecting factors" that will apply to individual choice of law
issues:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered?'

The effect of the Second Restatement is thus to "soften the
rigidity of the old [First Restatement] approach" by making the
single connecting factor of the old system-place of injury-just
one of several factors to be considered in the choice of law determination, and by providing the "most significant relationship" test as a "guiding prin~iple."~~
The Second Restatement
drew severe criticism, both during its preparation and after its
adoption by the ALI.31 Notwithstanding its detractors, the
Second Restatement also attracted glowing praise and a significant following.32 Included in that following was J.H.C.
Moms, who praised the Second Restatement as "'the most
impressive, comprehensive and valuable work on the conflict of
laws that has ever been produced in any country, in any language, at any time.'"33
Critics of the Second Restatement's approach argue that it
does not adequately emphasize the policies behind local law34

In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
Id. 6 146. Thus, section 146 reserves the lex loci delicti preferences for the forum
where the injury took place unless another state has a more significant interest in
the litigation.
29. Id. !j 145(2). Section 145 further provides that "[tlhese contacts are to be
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue." Id.
30. SCOLES& HAY, supra note 13, 8 2.14, at 37.
31. Not surprisingly, among the most vocal critics were Currie and
Ehrenzweig. Id. at 38.
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. SCOLES& HAY, supra note 13, § 2.14, at 38 (quoting J.H.C. Morris, Law
and Reason Triumphant or: How Not to Review a Restatement, 21 AM. J. COMP. L.
322, 324 (1973)).
34. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,
34 MERCERL. REV. 501, 518 (1983).
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and that its mechanical weighing of interests is often insuffi~ i e n t True
. ~ ~ enough, the approach of the Second Restatement
is to weigh all values equally:6 and when the court determines that two or more states have equal interests, some other
method of decision-a tiebreaker-is called for.37

A. The Mechanics of Section 6.01
The legislation proposed by the ALI's Complex Litigation
Project represents a major departure from modem choice of law
theory and from modern federal practice. Section 6.01 of the
Complex Litigation Proposal is composed of a series of fairly
rigid rules, including a hierarchical list of different ways of
determining which state's law will apply to complex litigation
transferred pursuant to the Proposal's transfer sections, sections 3.01 and 5 . 0 1 . ~ ~
First, subsection (a) of section 6.01 identifies the driving
force behind the Project's choice of law approach: the transferee
court is to choose the applicable law with an eye single to "applying, to the extent feasible, a single state's law to all similar
tort claims being asserted against a defendant."g
Second, the Proposal outlines in subsection (c) the three
factors a court must consider to determine which states have a
policy that would be firthered by the application of their state
law in a transferred proceeding: the place or places of injury,
the place or places of conduct causing the injury, and the primary place of business or habitual residences of the plaintiffs
and defendant^.^' The Proposal then deals with the false con-

Kay, supra note 17, at 559.
See Reese, supra note 34, at 515.
Kay, supra note 17, at 560.
See COMPLEXLITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 6.01.
Id. 8 6.01(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (a) reads in full:
(a) Except as provided in 8 6.04 through 8 6.06, in actions consolidated under 8 3.01 or removed under 8 5.01 in which the parties assert
the application of laws that are in material conflict, the transferee court
shall choose the law governing the rights, liabilities, and defenses of the
parties with respect to a tort claim by applying the criteria set forth in
subsections (c)-(e) with the objective of applying, to the extent feasible, a
single state's law to all similar to^ claims being asserted against a defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. 8 6.01k).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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flict situation, charging the court, if only one state has a policy
that would be furthered by the application of its law, to apply
that state's law.41More significantly, in the case of a true conflict, subsection (d) of section 6.01 provides the court a hierarchical list of rules to determine which state's law will apply:
(1)If the place of the injury and the place of the conduct
causing the injury are in the same state, that state's law
governs.
(2) If subsection (d)(l) does not apply, but all of the
plaintiffs habitually reside or have their primary places of
business in the same state, and a defendant has its primary
place of business or habitually resides in that state, that
state's law governs the claims with respect to that defendant.
Plaintiffs shall be considered as sharing a common habitual
residence or primary place of business if they are located in
states whose laws are not in material conflict.
(3) If neither subsection (d)(l)nor (d)(2)applies, but all
of the plaintiffs habitually reside or have their primary places
of business in the same state, and that state also is the place
of injury, then that state's law governs. Plaintiffs shall be
considered as sharing a common habitual residence or primary place of business if they are located in states whose laws
are not in material conflict.
(4) In all other cases, the law of the state where the
conduct causing the injury occurred governs. When conduct
occurred in more than one state, the court shall choose the
law of the conduct state that has the most significant relationship to the o~currence.'~

The effect of subsection (d) is that subsection (4)-applying the
rule of the state where the conduct causing the tort injury occurred-will determine the choice of law in the vast majority of
section 6.01 cases, since the restrictive geographic rules on
party residence found in subsections (dX1)-(3), by their very
terms, will rarely be satisfied in the dispersed-injury mass torts
Subsection (b) provides an escape hatch from the rigidity of
subsections (a), (c), and (d): in the case that the court determines that the application of a single state's law would be

41. Id. 5 6.01(d).
42. Id.
43. Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70
TEX.L. REV.1623, 1640-41(1992).
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inappropriate, it "may divide the actions into subgroups of
claims, issues, or parties to foster consolidated treatment under
section 3.01, and allow more than one state's law to be applied ."44
Finally, subsection (e) provides that the transferee court
may inject additional factors-factors not enumerated in subsection (c)-into the equation for determining the applicable
law or may depart from the order of preferences in subsection
(d) in order to "avoid unfair surprise or arbitrary results."45

B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Section 6.01
The Reporters' road map of the thought process behind the
drafting of section 6.01 begins inauspiciously at best: "Certainly, the most direct way to attempt to solve the issues posed [by
choice of law in the complex litigation context] would be to
adopt national standards to govern the conduct of individuals
or entities . . . who now are controlled by multiple, sometimes
conflicting, state laws."46 Having thus conceded that the
Project's approach is no better than second-best,47the Reporters then proceed to outline the approach of Chapter 6. Again
restating the global objectives of the Complex Litigation Project-to "foster[] the fair, just, and efficient resolution of the
cases embraced by [the] Proje~t"~~-the
Reporters address two
initial issues: first, whether sufficient justification exists to
change the "current reliance on state choice of law rules,""
and second, whether a federal choice of law code should simply
allow for the development of federal common law, whether it
should give the federal courts discretion to evaluate policies
and interests from an enumerated list, or whether it should

44. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 2,
45. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 2,

8 6.01(b) (emphasis added).

5 6.01(e). This subject thus
offers a second escape hatch from the rigors of subsection (d).
46. Id. a t 305. Noting the remote possibility of "reaching a political consensus
on what the appropriate federal standard should be" and doubting the resolve of
"Congress to intrude so directly into areas historically governed by state law," the
Reporters consign their fate to proposing a n admittedly less attractive, more indirect solution-the procedural approach of 8 6.01. Id.
47. Even those who praise the Proposal make this observation. See, e.g.,
Kozyris, supra note 3, a t 953.
48. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 2, a t 305.
49. Id. This issue is germane since the adoption of a federal statutory choice
of law code for complex litigation would necessarily intrude on a n area long governed by state law. Id.
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prescribe more precise, mechanical rules on how to select
among competing state interests?'
The Reporters elected the more precise, mechanical route.
They apparently felt that this decision best served the goal of
promoting efficiency in the handling of complex litigation and
found that "reasonably precise" choice of law rules would provide sufficient predictability and avoid conflicting results.51
Despite what may be said in criticism of this approach, the
Reporters must be credited for their honesty and forthrightness: having elected the precise, mechanical approach to federalizing choice of law, they confess that "[als will become clear
when the details of the following sections are examined, this
choice of law approach is an imperfect solution at best because
it requires the use of a highly complex set of standards in order
to accommodate the varying interests involved."52
The Reporters justify the decision to adopt the rigid federal
statutory approach by citing the need to discourage forum
shopping and the need to simplify the "extremely complicated
inquiry now needed" to select the applicable law in consolidated
cases." Thus, under the Project's approach, litigants would
purportedly have no incentive to forum shop for the most favorable law, since the applicable law will be selected regardless of
the plaintiffs choice of forum and likely without regard for the
interests and expectations of many litigants.
As to the complicated inquiry required of courts under
current choice of law theory, the Reporters' criticisms appear
plausible: "Even if one presumes that courts can divine unsettled state law with some degree of accuracy, there is sufficient
leeway in any analysis of governing law questions so that the
choice of law decision may be very ad h o ~ . "Further
~~
complicating the matter in the context of complex litigation is the fact
that, under current choice of law analysis, "more than one
choice of law rule may have to be applied, creating burdensome
individual issues that may be incompatible with consolidated
treatment? Thus, allowing the transferee court to select and
apply a single choice of law rule, reason the Reporters, elimi-

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id.
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nates this complication, provides for more predictability, and
allows "the development of a coherent body of law applying the
~ ~ intended result would be increased
federal ~ t a n d a r d . "The
judicial efficiency and fairne~s.~'
It is clear from the commentary accompanying the Proposal that the compelling purpose of the choice of law section is to
achieve the "highly desirable" result of applying a single state's
law to each particular issue that is common to all claims and
. ~ ~ Project concedes, however, that
parties in the l i t i g a t i ~ n The
the division of consolidated cases into issues may be necessary
in order to ensure that only truly common issues are treated
"in the agg~egate."~'Once the purely common issues have
been separated from the noncommon issues, the Project's interest in efficiency calls for application of one state's law to the
common issues.60The Project even contemplates application of
the federal choice of law standard upon remand, unless "justice
so that the efficiency achieved by applyrequires ~therwise,"~'
ing a single state's law to common claims is achieved in the
state courts as well.
The Project nonetheless recognizes the fact that "[iln some
circumstances it may not be possible or desirable to have a
single state's law control."62In such circumstances it may be
that consolidation should be avoided or aborted, or else limited
to certain kinds of claims and/or issues.63Another, and perhaps more attractive, option would be to subdivide the litigation pursuant to subsection 6.01(b) "when it appears preferable
that multiple state laws apply."4

C. The Preceding and Ensuing Debate
The rules adopted by the ALI in the Proposal are clearly
the result of a major groundswell of debate in the area of mass
torts choice of law. Among the issues central to this debate are
the propriety of adopting a federal choice of law code in the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
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first place and the proper approach of any such codification
effort.
1.

The propriety of a federal choice of law code

There seems to have been general agreement that seeking
the passage of a federal choice of law code would be a worthy
and worthwhile pursuit, notwithstanding the realization that a
more direct solution would be to adopt federal substantive
standards for liability.65 Professor Kozyris, for one, was a
strong advocate for a federal choice of law code, since the likely
alternative would be the conferral of federal common law-making authority on the federal courts, a prospect he finds distasteful? He thus regards the Proposal's simplified, mechanical
rules as indicia of a desire to avoid "finessing" choice of law
problems by "dumping the problem on the lap of the federal
courts called upon to create new types of common law."67
Professor Weintraub has agreed that a uniform choice of
law code would simplify litigation of mass tort cases:
Federal courts, when dealing with claims consolidated from
many different forums, would not face the task of applying
several choice-of-law approaches in the same opinion. Moreover, a legislated rule would relieve the judge of making de
novo the many difficult policy choices encountered in h c t i o n a1 choice-of-law analysis.68

Other commentators echo the call for a uniform choice of law
code, each with different insights on and criticisms of the
Project's chosen methods?'
2.

The proper approach of the federal choice of law code

Although there has been general agreement that drafting a
federal choice of law code would be desirable, the scholarship
divides quite sharply over the Project's approach, with particu-

65. See id. at 305; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing
the Project's settling for "second-best").
66. This is an option likewise considered, and rejected by the Drafters of the
Proposal. See COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 305.
67. Kozyris, supra note 3, at 955.
68. Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in
Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 145.
69. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code,
89 MICH.
L. REV.2134 (1991).
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lar debate over the proper role of interest-analysis in the mass
torts context.
a. Point: On one hand, supporters of the Project seem to
advocate any theory but the modern interest-balancing approach." Indeed, some writings, particularly those of Professor Kozyris, evidence delight that the Proposal rejects the modern, interest-balancing approach in favor of mechanical rules,
heralding the decision as "[alvoiding the wrong turns of interest analy~is."~'
Professor Nafziger has echoed these sentiments, opining
that the Proposal's prioritization of connecting factors is a "welcome departure &om the . . . troublesome Hydra of 'pure' government interest analysis."72According to Nafziger, the result
of interest analysis is that objective analysis, "like the threeheaded Hydra, . . . becomes the stuff of mythology" because
courts are able to manipulate interest analysis "to justify almost any result they want.''73 However, even Nafziger is not
completely satisfied with the Proposal: "The ALI Project deserves great credit for citing and clearly summarizing leading
scholarship about choice of law in mass tort cases. It is striking, however, that the cited literature and the Project itself
seldom stray beyond a select few cases.''74
Kozyris's criticisms of interest-balancing center around the
belief that interest analysis involves ad hoc attempts to determine the law of the controlling jurisdiction, which in turn includes analysis of legislative intent that is "virtually nonexistent''; further, Kozyris has argued that the dogmatic "interests"
involved in interest analysis are not only elusive, but also "malignant."75 Not dissimilarly, Professor Juenger argues that
"interest analysis has lost cohesion and coheren~e."'~
70. See, e.g., Kozyris, supra note 3, a t 955.
71. Id. a t 962. Kozyris argues that "but for the brilliance of Brainerd Currie
and the favorable climate at the time for iconoclastic attacks on the traditional
doctrine, [interest analysis] would have attracted much less attention." Id. Further,
he trumpets the Project's approach as "a welcome decision to transcend the vague,
subjective, and convoluted ad hoc methods advocated by the 'modern' conflicts theories and to generate choice-of-law legal norms to cover most situations in principled, predictable, efficient, and intelligible ways." Id. at 975.
72. Nafziger, supra note 5, a t 1002.
73. Id. a t 1003.
74. Id.
75. Kozyris, supra note 3, at 963.
76. Friedrich K. Juenger, Symposium on Interest Analysis in Conflict of Laws:
An Inquiry into Fundamentals with a Side Glance at Products Liability: What
Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 510 (1985).
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Thus, supporters of the Proposal have lauded it for its
rejection of interest analysis and its fixation on efficiency.
Kozyris notes that the Project's choice of law rules will help
fsee consolidated proceedings of "unnecessary complexities,"
namely complicated choice of law analysis.77Thus, he views
the adoption of the Proposal as the beginning of a much needed
"catharsis, if not purgation," in the area of conflicts.78He describes the Project's reliance on mechanical rules as a "total
rejection" of interest analysis, which he asserts to be an analy~~
the Prosis fraught with "intrinsic i n d e t e m i n a ~ y . "Instead,
ject adopts "precise, reciprocal, comprehensive conflicts rules
which will lead to predictable outcomes in most instances," according to its champions.80Nonetheless, many would object to
the mechanical nature of the Project's choice of law rules, calling for a more flexible approach, to which Kozyris would likely
quote Judge Posner, who wrote, "The opponents of mechanical
rules . . . may have given too little weight to the virtues of
~irnplicity."~'
b. Counterpoint: On the other hand, Professor Weintraub
acknowledges that any federal choice of law code should be an
easy rule to administer, one that would effect "a reasonable ac77, See Kozyris, supm note 3, at 954-55. Kozyris begins his analysis of the
Proposal "with ample praise for the fixation on conflicts efficiency." Id. at 956. He
does, however, identify a potential irrationality in extending the Proposal's newfound efficiency only to "consolidated" cases in the federal courts, a distinction he
regards as "questionable." Id. a t 954.
78. Id. at 975. Notwithstanding his praise of the Proposal, Kozyris still describes it as "a glass half full": first, # 6.01 is clearly not perfect in that it is
"good for torts in general, but not custom-made enough to fit the typical mass
torts in consolidated cases"; second, the key connectors of 4 6.01(d) are "not adequately highlighted, while certain peripheral factors are included in an excessively
eclectic environment." Id. at 967-68. In this respect, Kozyris's criticism of interest
analysis is analogous to Professor Juenger's criticism of conflicts academicians generally when he said:
Their predilection for theoretical speculations has trapped conflicts scholars in a time warp. Preoccupied with stale issues, they fail to come to
grips with the more pressing problems of our days. Such neglect is regrettable. Counsel and judges who must wrestle with these problems
surely would welcome guidance from the experts. As for conflicts theory, a
study of mass disaster cases could bring new insights to a discipline that
is currently viewed as mired in sophistry and obfuscation.
Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U . ILL. L.
REV. 105, 108, quoted in Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1625.
79. Kozyris, supra note 3, at 965-66.
80. Id. at 965.
81. Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1987),
quoted in Weintraub, supra note 68, at 131-32.
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commodation of the policies underlying conflicting liability
laws."82Weintraub also opines that the code should embrace a
certain amount of flexibility, "some play in the joints" rather
than rigid rules, "so that the rule does not compel a bad result
in an unusual or unforeseen circum~tance."~~
Weintraub is steadfast in his belief that the First Restatement approach has outlived its usefulness and thus should not
have been incorporated into the Proposal. As he puts it, "Alas,
it is probably too late to turn the choice-of-law clock back. Mechanical conflicts rules, like mechanical rules in any field of
law, cause covert resistance.""
Professor Seidelson likewise remains a proponent of interest analysis and criticizes section 6.01 as a 'Serry-built choiceof-law provision," as it consists of a "little bit of interest analysis," too much of the Second Restatement, and several "seemingly slapdash subsections having no apparent legitimate antecedents" in conflict of laws.85In one article, Professor Seidelson
explores the practical function of subsections 6.01(d)(l)-(4),
concluding that interest analysis is, after all, the preferable
mode of analysis for mass tort choice of law.86
Professor Mullenix likewise discounts the rules of the Complex Litigation Project Proposal, arguing that they do little to
assist in determining the applicable law in "truly dispersed"
As she says, "For the hard cases, the
mass tort litigati~n.~?
[Drafters] have proposed virtually useless rules."88 According
to Mullenix, who acknowledges that the Proposal's "provisions
and commentary sound perfectly plausible and reasoned (albeit
reflecting the proposers' own conflicts preferences)," the rules of
section 6.01 will not function adequately in the case of "truly
massive" tort litigati~n.~'

D. Escaping from Section 6.01
As has been stated previously, the rules of section 6.01
have been widely described as mechanical, certainty-assuring
82.
83.
the law
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Weintraub, supra note 68, at 145.
Id. Weintraub would have preferred a choice of law approach that applied
of the plaintiff's habitual residence. Id. at 156.
Id. at 133.
Seidelson, supra note 6, at 1111.
Id. at 1137.
Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1630.
Id. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1630-31.
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approaches to choice of law. Critics of the rule deride the mechanics of the section as "rigid" constraints, while supporters
prefer to use the term "precise."g0 Notwithstanding the
section's intended precision or rigidity, it is clear the Drafters
intended to inject some flexibility and reasonableness into the
law-choosing process when they drafted and adopted subsection
6.01(b), the "escape hatch." Just like the exception to the mechanical rules in subsection 6.01(e), subsection 6.01(b) should
be used liberally, "when appr~priate,"~'to deal fairly with
mass tort cases.
Not surprisingly, the strength of the Drafters' commitment
in section 6.01(a) to the application of one state's law has
spawned one of Project's more significant debates. Professor
Symeonides is quick to point out that the Project's aim of applying a single law to all similar claims against a defendant is
only "[olne of the purposes of Chapter 6."92After all, the single-law objective is not unqualified in the text of Chapter 6
since the Drafters provide courts with several "escape hatches."
First, subsection 6.01(b) authorizes subdivision into subgroups
of "claims, issues, or parties" and allows more than one state's
law to apply if applying a single law would be inappropriate in
the court's opinion.93 Second, the same subsection authorizes
the court to sever and remand to the transferor courts claims
or issues that "should [not] be governed by the law chosen by
the application of the rules [of Chapter 6]."94 The Drafters
clearly contemplated the subsection's use on some scale, and it
seems that a liberal construction of subsection 6.01(b) is within
the realm of reason.
Third, subsection 6.01(e), which is to be employed in order
to "avoid[] unfair surprise or arbitrary results," has been interpreted to be a mechanism to vindicate concerns of the parties
rather than those of the state.95 Thus, subsection 6.01(e) allows the court to inject additional connectors into its choice
analysis when proper.

90. See COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 305-06.
91. See id. 5 6.01(b).
92. Symeonides, supra note 5, at 859.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 860 (quoting COMPLEX LITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 2,
$ 6.01(b)).
95. See Kozyris, supra note 3, at 965. Kozyris regards the "unfair surprise"
escape hatch of subsection 6.01(e) as a means for introducing better-fitted connectors to courts' analysis in the consolidated context. Id. at 975.
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An even more liberal construction of both subsections (b)
and (e) is warranted, especially considering the heated debate
over the propriety of subsection 6.01(d)'s rigid formulations.
A s has been discussed elsewhere,g6subsection 6.01(c) enumerates the factors or contacts the court should consider when
determining which states have "legitimate interests" in having
their state tort policies applied to the case." These criteria
are the place of injury, conduct, business, or habitual residences of the plaintiffs and defendant^.^' The function of subseo
tion 6.01(d) is to prioritize the interests of the states identified
by subsection 6.01(c) if more than one state has an interest
that would be furthered by the application of its law to the
case." In the case of a widely dispersed mass tort (e.g., Agent
Orange, Dalkon Shield, Bendectin-DES, and asbestos) subsections 6.01(d)(l)-(3)will almost never apply to the case, since all
three of those subsections are premised upon common residency. For example, (d)(l) provides that if the place of the injury
and the place of the conduct causing the injury are the same
state, that state's law applies.loOAlso, (d)(2) would call for application of the law of the state where all of the plaintiffs habitually reside or have their place of business and the defendant
also has its principal place of busine~s.'~'Finally, (d)(3) is the
third tie-breaking rule: the law of the state of all the plaintiffs'
habitual residences or principal places of business will apply if
that state is also the place of injury. It should be clear that
these three tests will almost never be met in the case of even
moderately dispersed torts, although they may match up nicely
with certain single-site events or mass-accident cases.lo2
Therefore, in dispersed tort litigation, subsection 6.01(d)(4)
will almost always apply since it is the catch-all preference rule
of section 6.01: "In all other cases, the law of the state where
the conduct causing the injury occurred governs. When conduct
occurred in more than one state, the court shall choose the law
of the conduct state that has the most significant relationship

96. See supra text accompanying note 40.
97. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, $ 6.01(c).
98. Id.
99. Id. 8 6.01(c).
100. Id. $ 6.01(d)(l).
101. Id. $ 6.01(d)(2).
102. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1641 (citing as examples Love Canal and a
hypothetical Southwestern Airlines plane crash in Texas).
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to the occ~rrence."'~~
The possibility for prodefendant bias is
inherent in subsection 6.01(d)(4)'s preference for the law of the
state where the conduct causing the injury took place, which in
the case of dispersed torts is most likely to be the defendant's
"home state." Therefore, to combat this potential bias as well as
the significant potential for general unfairness, surprise, and
irrationality created by the rigid, mechanical approaches of all
of subsection 6.01(d), the "escape hatches" of subsections
6.01(b) and (e) would best be used frequently, especially in the
dispersed tort case. lo4

IV. CONCLUSION
A liberal construction and application of subsection 6.01(b)
must be considered by Congress and by courts that may be
called upon to interpret the Proposal's provisions even if they
never become law.lo5 Liberal construction of subsection
6.01(b) is mandated by the effect of the other rules of section
6.01, which will not likely function adequately in the case of a
dispersed mass tort.lo6
Given the potential for surprising and unfair results in
mass disaster cases, Congress and the courts would be welladvised to rethink the Project's choice of law strictures
throughout, but given the potential for beneficial results under
other sections of t h e proposed federal legislation,
decisionmakers may be more likely to accept minor adjustments in the Project's approach rather than wholesale rejection
or revision. A significant area for improvement of the Proposal
is subsection 6.01(b), whose frequent and liberal application in
mass torts cases should be welcomed by policy makers and
scholars alike.
While use of the escape hatch will not allow the complete
simplification of choice of law analysis in the average consolidated case, many of the gains in efficiency, simplicity, and
consistency can still be retained. Subdivision of litigants and
claims and application of different states' laws to each subgroup will guarantee significant gains in efficiency, especially

103. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL supra note 2, !l6.01(d)(4).
104. See generally supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
105. The very existence of the Proposal will undoubtedly make it an extremely
influential source, like the various Restatements, for judges managing mass tort
cases, even if the Proposal never sees the light of day in Congress.
106. See Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1640.
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when thousands of litigants are involved. While subsection
6.01(b) may sacrifice, in the name of fairness, some of the efficiency gains envisioned by the Drafters, those sacrifices will
not outweigh the gains in fairness. In summary, subsection
6.01(b)'s liberal construction would have a procompetitive effect
in that similar groups of litigants would be treated similarly,
and the courts' task in choice of law analysis will still be significantly simplified and expedited.
The history of American choice of law analysis is a storied
one, the only constant being debate and disagreement over the
propriety of certain approaches. The circumstances surrounding
the drafting and adoption of the Complex Litigation Project
Proposal have been no different. The Proposal is the product of
more than eight years of work by some of the brightest conflict
of laws scholars in the land; its provisions will not be ignored.
But they may yet be improved by increasing the potential fairness of the Project's choice of law procedures.
Fred I. Williams

